This paper contributes to the literature on comparative performance of family and non-family businesses by accounting for self-selection and by comparing performance within and across industries. Using an extensive data set of Dubai businesses in the four different major sectors in the Dubai economy (construction, manufacturing, services, and trading); we find that industry matters. Family businesses outperform nonfamily businesses in trading, followed by construction as a far second. Performance of family businesses is weakest in manufacturing and services, only in trading did family businesses outperform nonfamily exporting businesses in other sectors. Reasons for that are discussed and policy implications are drawn. We also find strong evidence of self-selection bias.
INTRODUCTION
In their overview of family business performance, Jackiewicz and Klein (2005) report that of the 41 studies that compared family to nonfamily businesses, 25 find the former outperform the latter, 5 find the opposite, and 11 find no significant difference between the two types of firms. Dyer (2006) argues that such differences in results are not surprising given the differences in approaches and definitions of family enterprises (see also Kotey, 2005 , Anderson and Reeb, 2003 , Lauterbach and Vaninsky, 1999 , Westhead and Cowling, 1997 , Daily and Dollinger, 1992 .
What is surprising, however, is that, as far as we know, none of the studies controlled for selfselection bias (Heckman, 1979 ) and most do not assess differences in performance within and across industries. If selection bias is present, the observed differences in firm performance are attributed to business type when they may be due to differences between the enterpeneurs who chose between the two types of business structures. Similarly, if a business' amenability to family versus nonfamily Belaid Rettab et al, Int.J.Buss.Mgt.Eco.Res., Vol 2(3),2011,222-237 management hinges on the type of industry, it is crucial to have industry an additional contextual variable.
In this paper we use an extensive data set of Dubai businesses to test for differences in family verus nonfamily firms within and across the four major sectors in the Dubai economy (construction, manufacturing, services, and trading). Dubai is a particularly interesting and representative case study of the Gulf region, where, until the recent financial crisis, economic growth has been phenomenal and little is known about the relative performance of family businesses and thereby their relative contribution to such growth. Family businesses comprise most of the enterprises in the Gulf region (Davis, Pitts, and Cormier, 1997) . They account for over 90 percent of all commercial activities in the Gulf region, compared to rates ranging from 65 to 80 percent in other regions of the world.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The next section reviews and discusses the literature on comparative performance of family and nonfamily firms. Section 3 defines a family business in general, and section 4 develops a working definition for a family business in Dubai.
Section 5 presents the data, method, and results. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
FAMILY VERSUS NON-FAMILY PERFORMANCE
Casting comparative performance of firms in terms of family versus non-family businesses is a useful approach to capturing the influence of business structure on business performance. One particularly important element of structure, discussed extensively in the literature, is the degree of ownership and management control (Dyer, 2006, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Romano et al., 2000; Mustakallio, 2002) .
It is generally accepted that concentration of control can bring about economic entrenchment and misallocation of resources (Morck R., D. Wolfenzon and B. Yeung, (2005) . Misallocation is attributed to the well-known principle-agent problem but also to the principal-principal conflict emphasizing the problem of minority shareholders (Young, et al., 2008 , Mueller, 2006 . The latter conflict is commonly present in emerging economies with institutions that encourage control and tolerate bad corporate governance. In this context, does high concentration of control, as exhibited by a family enterprise, affect firm performance? And what is the role of the supporting institutions operating in the background?
On one hand, institutions are found to significantly determine business performance (Morck and Yeung, 2004; La Porta et al., 2000; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Jagannathan, 1996) . On the other hand, in the absence of sound institutions and regulatory framework, is ownership and control able to provide a less enforced, but equally potent, internal regulatory environment for business? In China for example, it is reported that family businesses provide alternative framework for businesses to "reduce risk in uncertain, complex and potentially hostile environments" (Erdener and Shapiro, 2005; p. 415) .
Furthermore, the degree of concentration of ownership and control is motivated by business strategies, strategies to manage risks stemming from surrounding institutions. Minority shareholders in publicly owned companies have, in general, highly diversified investment portfolios and are therefore considered more likely to accept potentially risky ventures in return for lucrative earnings.
Conversely, the owner of a family firm is likely to have a more concentrated investment portfolio, holding a high proportion of personal wealth within the own firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shulze et al., 1998; Zellweger, 2006; McConaughy et al., 2001) . Consequently, does this excessive cautious behaviour hinder family firm performance (Romano et al., 2000 , Shulze et al., 1998 , and results in sub-optimal capital asset structure and performance?
Some researchers (Kotey, 2005, p. 399) suggest that due to corporate governance issues, such as the lack of transparency and accountability, family enterprises remain small and, therefore, have less access to capital. However, the evidence is inconclusive across samples. Jorissen et al. (2005) report that once demographic differences are controlled for, family firms face more financing problems than non-family firms with regards to long-term financing (see also Andersson and Reeb, 2003 and Zellweger, 2006) .
In this connection, Anderson and Reeb (2003) contend that family owners are predominantly concerned with "stability and capital preservation" rather than firm growth, performance and size.
However, if stability is used as an indicator of firm performance, Lee (2006) would agree and Suehiro (2001) would disagree that family firms are more stable in times of economic downturn than nonfamily enterprises.
What transpires from the previous discussion is that, because of the several characteristics of family versus nonfamily firms and the interaction between those characteristics, there is no clear a priori expectation that one type of firm should outperform the other. That expectation becomes less clear when considering contextual variables such as firm size and industry. Hence, relative performance of family versus non-family firms is an empirical question, and preponderance of evidence from different studies is what ultimately shapes the metaview of the superiority of one business over the other. Our empirical analysis for Dubai is a contribution to shaping that metaview. Our starting point is to discuss in the next section the different definitions for a family business used in the literature. After that we discuss our definition of what constitutes a family business in Dubai. Belaid Rettab et al, Int.J.Buss.Mgt.Eco.Res., Vol 2(3),2011,222-237 
DEFINITION OF A FAMILY BUSINESS
The assortment of family business attributes outlined in section 2 has led to an assortment of definitions of a family business in the literature. In their survey of family business literature, Chua et al. (1999) found 21 different definitions.
Basically, family business attributes are related to one of three components: family, ownership, and management; and the definition of a family business depend on the overlap of the three. This is illustrated in the Venn diagram in Figure 1 . The three components plus the four overlapping areas constitute seven possible connections, with each connection tied to some degree of influence.
Figure 1: Overlapping Components of a Family Business
Source: Gersick, Davis, McCollom Hampton and Lansberg (1997) Individuals with only one connection to the business would lie in 1, 2, or 3, and those with more than one connection would lie in any of the other intersections. For example, intersections 4, 5, and 7 identify family members who are directly involved in the business management and its ownership.
Intersections 2, 3, and 6 include managers, employees and possible co-owners from outside the family.
Several examples from the literature will serve to illustrate how different authors in different contexts have devised different definitions based on the overlapping components shown in the Venn diagram. Westhead and Cowling (1998) suggested the following 7 definitions for a family business. 3) 1 and 2.
4) 3 and one or more of the management team is drawn from the largest family group that
owns the business.
5) 3 and 51 percent or more of the management team is drawn from the largest family group
that owns the business.
6) And the enterprise is owned by second-generation or family members.

7) 5 and the enterprise is owned by second-generation or family members.
DEFINITION OF A FAMILY BUSINESS IN THE CONTEXT OF DUBAI
The preceding conceptual framework and applications not only require information on family membership, degree of ownership and management by family members; they also require establishing a cut-off point at which the degree of influence is significant enough to designate a business as a family business. Unfortunately, that information is not available for Dubai.
What is available is a categorization of family versus non-family businesses in Dubai devised by Rettab (2008) (Table 1 ). The definition draws on UAE's company law which requires 51% ownership of a business by UAE nationals, and on labour law regulating employer-employee 1 relationship. Defining businesses with a share of foreign equity as non-family businesses is supported by the roles of the UAE partner in the day-to-day management of the business. There are three roles. One, in almost all small businesses (less than 10 workers) with foreign equity, the formal owner of the license is the so-called the UAE national sponsor or the silent partner. The partnership is a well established sponsorship system enforced by law. In this case, since the capital is wholly provided by the foreign partner(s) who attend to all activities and take all decisions related to the conduct of the business, the foreign partners are the actual owners and the managers in full control. The UAE partner does not actively participate in the day-to-day business management but sponsorship is just an arrangement to conform to the Federal Company Law. Therefore, small businesses with foreign equity are classified as nonfamily businesses.
Two, in medium-sized businesses (10 to 19 workers) with foreign equity, UAE nationals are more likely to be non-silent partners, but their presence in the firm is mostly for formality reasons and for facilitating access to local authorities and agencies, as well as monitoring local employees and local clientele. However, control and management remain in the hands of foreign partners.
Three, large businesses (20 employees or more) with foreign equity are formally organized and ownership of capital and liabilities of owners are stipulated in legal documents. However, in most such businesses, although the UAE partner is a member of the board of directors because of his/her share in capital investment, decision-makers are usually foreigners. Therefore, large businesses with foreign equity are also assumed to be non-family businesses.
DATA AND ANALYSIS
The data set we extract information from to examine the comparative performance of family versus nonfamily businesses comes from the 2005 Dubai Chamber's membership database. The total number of members is 20,576; 10,597 are family businesses and 9,979 are nonfamily businesses.
Reported by each business are income, exports, number of owners, number of employees, paid-up capital, cohort (whether a business started operation before or after 1990), location (whether or not a business is located in the free zone), and the industry category to which a business belongs. The industry categories are manufacturing, construction, trading, and services.
Performance is represented by the following linear model:
Y nijk = µ + B i + I j + E k + α ijk *OWN nijk + β ijk *CAP nijk + δ ijk *EMP nijk + (B*I)ij + (B*E) ik + (I*E) jk + (B*I*E) ijk + γ*SS + e nijk,
where Y is income, µ is the intercept, B is business type, I is industry category, E is export status, OWN is the number of owners, CAP is paid-up capital, EMP is number employees, and SS is a measure of self-selection. The subscript nijk refers to nth firm, for n=1,…20576; in the ith business, where i=1 for a family business and i=2 for a nonfamily business; in the jth industry, where j=1 for manufacturing (MAN), j=2 for construction (CON), j=3 for trading (TRD), and j=5 for services (SRV).
The subscript k is equal to 1 if the firm exports and 2 if it does not.
Although the choice of variables is ex-post, as it is dictated by what is available in the data set, the variables capture the essence, although imperfectly, of some determinants of family versus non-family firms outlined in section 2. The number of owners is a proxy for agency costs, i.e., the larger the number of owners the higher the agency costs. Paid-up capital is a proxy for risk and extent of internal financing. The number of employees could, as has been assumed in past work, be an indicator of the size of the firm as well as agency costs. With a larger pool of employees, issues related to moral hazard take on crucial importance.
The variable SS is the inverse mills ratio calculated from a Probit model as suggested by Heckman (1979). The ratio controls for selection. A positive (negative)
γ indicates presence of selection bias that overstates (understates) the effect family business structure on performance. The bias is overstated (understated) if stronger (weaker) "business people"
chose to run a family business. The error e nijk ~ iid N(0, σ 2 ijk ) accounts for the error structure which allows for heterogeneous variances by business type, industry, and export status. Table 1 below.
What transpires from the Probit results is that firms with more owners are less likely to organize as family businesses, as were firms who started business after 1990, a period which witnessed strong From the Probit results, we construct the mills ratio:
where φ(X, θ) is the density function, Φ(X, θ) is the distribution function, and θ is the vector of parameter estimates from the Probit model reported in Table 1 .
Before estimating the linear statistical model of performance (equation 1), we conducted a preliminary check of the distribution of the regressors through histograms. The check revealed that the regressors are highly skewed, with the largest values of some regressors often being the smallest values. A rule of thumb is that if the largest value is more than three times larger than the smallest value, a log transformation of the regressors is needed, mitigating the problem of extreme outliers (Chatterjee and Price, 1991) .
The performance equation was estimated using the SAS Proc Mixed routine (Little et al., 2006) The first hypothesis of interest is self-selection bias. The coefficient γ for the variable controlling for selection is 0.239 and a standard error 0.049, indicating (statistically) strong presence of self-selection bias that tends to overstate the effect of family business structure on performance. The implication is that analysis for comparative performance of family and nonfamily businesses in the Dubai case should account for self-selection bias.
The next hypotheses of interest are those related to the statistical importance of the fixed effects, the covariates, and interactions thereof. Results are reported in Table 2 .
Individually, the fixed effects B, I and E are highly significant and so are the covariates OWN, EMP, and CAP. The interactions are all highly significant with three exceptions: business type by exports status (B*E), industry type by export status (I*E), and business type by industry by numbers of owners (OWN*B*I).
Next we take a look at the comparative performance of family business vis-à-vis nonfamily businesses by industry and by export status. Table 3 compares performance of family and nonfamily businesses in the construction business. The rows highlighted in gray indicate instances of superior performance. The first highlighted row in gray is read as follows: a family business in the construction business that does not export is superior in performance to a nonfamily business in construction that does not export. The second highlighted row indicates that a family business in construction that does not export outperforms a nonfamily business in Manufacturing that does not export. The rest of the rows can be read in a similar manner. Results for manufacturing are in Table 4 . It appears that family businesses in manufacturing outperform nonfamily businesses only in 25 percent of the cases, outperformed nonfamily businesses in manufacturing only when nonfamily businesses in manufacturing are not exporters, and, as in construction; in no other instance did they outperform nonfamily businesses who export. Belaid Rettab et al, Int.J.Buss.Mgt.Eco.Res., Vol 2(3),2011,222-237 In the services industry (Table 5) , family businesses outperformed nonfamily business only in 25 percent of the cases, did not outperform nonfamily businesses in services only when the family business exports and the nonfamily business does not, and in no other instance did they outperform nonfamily businesses in services who export. The outcome for the trading sector is radically different (Table 6 ). Family businesses outperform nonfamily business in 71 percent of the cases. Trading family-businesses who do not export outperform only nonfamily businesses who do not export. However, trading family-businesses who export outperform all other nonfamily businesses who export in all sectors except those who also trade. Still, in the latter case, there is no statistical difference between the two.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The message from the preceding results is that industry and institutions matter. In terms of performance by sector, as measured by the percent of cases in which family businesses outperform nonfamily businesses; family businesses are strongest in trading, followed by construction as a far second. Family businesses are weakest in manufacturing and services. More importantly, only in trading did family business outperform nonfamily exporting businesses in other sectors.
There are three distinguishing characteristics of the trading sector in Dubai that may explain the superior performance of family businesses in that sector relative to other sectors. The first is institutional. UAE families in the trading sector have historically been granted exclusive commercial licenses by the government. To the extent that such licenses are grants of monopoly power, the implications for performance are clear. Second, because successful trading has historically been and still is still tied to strong family networks, the stronger performance of family businesses is a manifestation of the strength of those networks. The strength of family network also helps explain why nonfamily businesses who export are on par with family businesses who also export. Nonfamily businesses in the trading sector also rely on family and nonfamily networks in native countries of the owners of nonfamily businesses. Third, trading has the least technological requirement, thus exposing UAE traders to less competition from the rest of the sectors, where the technological requirements are relatively higher.
The policy implication is that in order to bring Dubai family businesses on par with nonfamily businesses in the other more technologically demanding sectors, a technology adoption agenda needs to be targeted towards family businesses in those sectors.
